We are right to see power, prestige, and confidence as conditioned by the Civil War. But it is a very easy step to regard the War, therefore, as a jolly piece of luck only slightly disguised, part of our divinely instituted success story, and to think, in some shadowy corner of the mind, of the dead at Gettysburg as a small price to pay for the development of a really satisfactory and cheap compact car with decent pick-up and road-holding capability. It is to our credit that we survived the War and tempered our national fiber in the process, but human decency and the future security of our country demand that we look at the costs. We hope that this article will help to resolve some of the broader issues concerning the economic effects of the war. Although this work does not answer completely the questions raised by the classic studies in this field, it does provide data which should be helpful in unriddling some of them.
A computation of the cost of the American Civil War involves all of these complications. The mere adding up of expenditures on the war effort and the yalue of destroyed physical and human capital does not equal the total cost of the conflict, for it neglects the costs of instability, commercial stoppage and other economic factors.3 Furthermore, Louis Hacker and Charles and Mary Beard have suggested social and political reasons for doubting that this summation equals the net cost. 4 Although the cost of the American Civil War is referred to in many studies, no systematic computation has been made of it. Even a recent volume of essays on the economic impact of the Civil War does not include an estimate.' Despite the fact that no complete study of Civil War costs has been made, several researchers have suggested the extent to which the war drained the economy during its four years. However, these studies have equated war costs with the totality of military expenditures and capital destruction and have thereby omitted both possible additional costs and benefits.6
Some researchers who have studied these war costs have neglected human casualties, although for many purposes these costs should be included. There are several methods of estimating the loss of human 4 Charles and Mary Beard interpret the Civil War as enabling the North through victory to achieve greater economic progress. The Beards state, "The Second American Revolution, while destroying the economic foundation of the slaveowning aristocracy, assured the triumph of business enterprise. . .. In 1860, just a little more than a billion dollars was invested in manufacturing and only 1,500,000 industrial wage earners were employed in the United States. In less than fifty years the capital had risen to more than twelve billion and the number of wage earners to 5,500,000. life. Using a human capital approach, a summation of both the foregone earnings of those who died and the difference between actual and hypothetical earnings of those who were wounded can be a fair approximation of these costs. It is important to note that the method of evaluating war deaths and war wounds depends critically on how the war cost estimate is to be applied. A human capital approach appears justified if one wants to know the extent to which gross national product or some other measure of economic activity was reduced as a consequence of the war. But if one is considering the losses experienced by those who survived the war, inclusion of the full marginal products of those who did not would be unjustified.
In the empirical analysis which follows, the simple method of calculating war costs, involving the summation of all war-related expenditures and losses, is termed the "direct" estimate. In our calculations this statistic includes all Union and Confederate war expenditures, and human and physical capital destroyed in military actions. But because the estimate produced by this simple addition is incomplete we have constructed an "indirect" measure. We have created for this purpose a hypothetical North and South7 which did not fight a war during the years 1861 to 1865. The consumption stream of persons in the warless economy is compared to that actually achieved with the war. The discounted value of the difference between these two streams represents the net costs (or possibly net benefits) of the war.
The indirect cost of the war has been calculated two ways. In one calculation, called the indirect cost to the "native" population, we compute the cost of the war to those persons living in the U.S. in 1861 and to their descendants. Therefore, we have not considered in this estimate that portion of the war's economic impact passed on to those who emigrated after 1861. This variant is important, for example, in interpreting political decisions made in 1861.
A second indirect computation yielded the total net cost of the war to all persons in the United States. It therefore also includes the cost of the war to those who entered the U.S. after 1861. The difference between this indirect and the direct estimate represents the cost of all items which could not be computed directly. For example, if computed for the Union this measure would include any redistributive gains from political victory.
THE DIRECT COST OF THE CIVIL WAR

General Method
The direct estimate of the cost of the war, as we have noted, includes all war expenditures by both Union and Confederate governments (including state and local outlays), and the value of destroyed human and physical capital. In only a limited way are the losses due to the disruptive effects of the war included in this calculation, and any gross benefits from the war are not incorporated.8
The direct cost of the war for the North is simpler to calculate than for the South. The records of the Union government are more complete and more accurate than those of the Confederacy. Even more important, the destruction of physical capital was almost wholly concentrated in the South.
The Direct Cost of the Civil War to the North
The components of our direct estimate for the North are given in Table 1 . Because supporting materials for this calculation and many 8 The direct cost of the war can be represented graphically using the familiar production possibilities frontier where the axes include both present and future consumption of the outputs guns and butter. The distance AB in the figure below represents all expenditures on war machinery. CE is the direct measure of the cost of Guns _Z~ 4 fth war F C 0 E Butter the war, but since it is evaluated at the current price ratio, the true cost is overstated by DE. However, since annual expenditures were a minor fraction of total product (about 10 to 20 percent of GNP for both North and South) DE can be considered negligible. This follows because the marginal cost curve of guns probably had a very high elasticity. The direct cost estimate also may exceed actual foregone consumption because the war may have generated an increase in work effort shifting the production possibilities curve outward. We have not considered this point in our analysis. The destruction of human and physical capital shifts the production possibilities frontier inward, say to the dotted curve in the diagram. The distance FC represents additional foregone future consumption of butter due to the loss of productive capital. The total direct cost of the war is the sum of CD and FC. Table 2. though northern forces were exceptionally well-equipped it is improbable that the opportunity cost of Confederate manpower and resources per active soldier was forty percent that for Union troops.12
One of the major factors biasing downward these expenditures is the seizure of goods which became quite common as the war progressed and inflation mounted. The Confederate army forced sales at lower than current prices and when convenient charged prices quoted during previous transactions. Because inflation was quite rapid, equivalent transactions just a month apart in 1863 differed in price by as much as twenty percent. Goods were also seized without compensation.'3 In addition, military pay was frequently delayed and paid in much depreciated currency or withheld entirely.
Contemporary descriptions of the extent of seizure and failure to pay troops imply that expenditure data for the Confederacy, especially during the period after 1863, understate the true cost of the war. We have therefore constructed an adjusted calculation (see Table 3 ) using the assumption that the opportunity cost of a Confederate soldier equalled that of a Union soldier.14 The total labor cost is therefore a multiple of the average size of the Confederate army and the Union wage.15 To obtain the cost of capital for the Confederate forces we assume that equipment expenditures per Confederate soldier were one-half those of the Union. The total adjusted figure is not particularly sensitive to changes in this assumption, since labor costs comprise fifty-seven percent of total Union expenditures. Reducing this proportion to one-fourth or increasing it to three-fourths changes our adjusted expenditure estimate by only $232 million, or about seven percent of our figure for the total direct cost to the South. In addition, the South, like the North, transferred some war costs to soldiers through the use of a draft, and these costs were added to the direct estimate.
Physical capital destruction accounts for over one-third of the 12 This statistic can be calculated using Tables 1 and 2 and estimates of military  manpower given in Table 2 e Using Randall and Donald's estimates (p. 252) we assume 300,000 men were conscripted and that on average the cost imposed on them was the same as for Union draftees. This may bias our figure downward since a much higher percentage of the Confederate population was drafted.
d Physical capital destruction in the South is measured by the difference between the value of (non-slave) capital in 1860 and that at the end of the war. The pre-war estimate is based on the true rather than appraised valuation of capital given in the 1860 Census for the eleven states which seceded, with an adjustment to account for the formation of West Virginia. Because of the inadequacy of the 1870 Census with respect to the South, our post-war estimate is based on an 1880 Census valuation of capital. We assume that the rate of growth of capital per person between 1870 and 1880 was the same in the South as it was in the North for Engerman observes that commodity output per capita grew at the same rate in both regions. (See S. Engerman, "The Economic Impact of the Civil War," reprinted in R. Andreano, Economic Impact of the American Civil War.) Our capital destruction figure is highly tentative. But although we are unable to assess the magnitude of all possible biases, it appears that if we have erred it is in the direction of overestimating the true capital loss. This lends further support to our conclusion in the latter part of the paper that the direct estimate is less than the indirect one. See "A Note on Physical Destruction in the South" in "Notes."
e We accept Randall and Donald's estimate of 258,000 Confederate deaths (p. 531) and assume the cost per man to be equal in the North and South. This is justified on the grounds that free per capita income in the South was approximately equal to that in the North in 1860.
f We assume here, due to a lack of southern statistics, that the ratio of dead to wounded was identical in the North as in the South and apply the same logic as in h See text and Table 3 for a discussion of the adjusted figure. adjusted direct cost of the war. We have arrived at this figure by subtracting the discounted and deflated value of physical capital (excluding slaves) at the end of the war from that at the beginning. The procedure used is partially described in Table 2 , note d, and the final estimate should be considered tentative and probably biased upward.
THE INDIRECT COSTS OF THE CIVIL WAR
General Method
The direct computation of the cost of the war is obviously deficient in several respects. It does not fully account for all costs, and furthermore it does not allow for possible benefits to accrue either to the North or more remotely to the entire economy from the shifting of political power. Therefore, we have devised an indirect method of estimating this statistic which incorporates all possible costs and benefits to wartime citizens as well as those to future generations. This indirect estimate is disaggregated by cost to Union versus Confederate citizens and computed in two ways depending on the definition of a citizen. One estimate defines citizens as all residents, that is it includes immigrants who entered the U.S. after the war began. The other computes the cost to only those living in the U.S. at the outbreak of the conflict and to their descendants.
The general method used is to create a hypothetical economy which did not fight the war. Although various assumptions concerning the growth of per capita consumption are made, the basic supposition is that in the absence of war the economy would have grown at its pre-war rate. For example, the hypothetical southern 16 The basic assumption chosen is, of course, one of many which could be applied to such a hypothetical warless economy. Nonetheless, there is some evidence to support our choice. George Rogers Taylor Table IV 17 The indirect cost of the war can also be represented graphically using a production possibilities frontier. We again draw the axes in terms of present and future guns and butter. If the only effect of the war were to increase the output of guns, from OA to OB, and reduce that for butter, from OD to OC, then the direct and indirect measures would be almost identical. We could represent the indirect cost as CD on the butter axis, that is the foregone consumption due to the war. But if the war involved factors such as political instability, commercial disruption, and We must stress that consumption, not income, is the relevant measure for the cost of a war. Even though measured income may not decrease during a war (it may even increase), consumption could fall dramatically. Therefore, the cost of a war may be positive although income remains constant. Furthermore any investment which is destroyed or created is evaluated in our indirect measure in terms of the consumption it inhibits or eventually generates.
The Indirect Costs of the War to the North (excluding foregone consumption of those killed)
The indirect cost of the war to the North is the present value in 1861 of the decrease in consumption which resulted from the war. It can be represented in general terms as the following summation: where Cht is hypothetical consumption at time t, Cat is actual consumption at time t, and i is the discount rate. The basic assumption employed for the North is that per capita consumption would have expanded at a constant rate after 1860 such that hypothetical consumption was equal to actual consumption by 1879. It is assumed, therefore, that the more rapid rate observed in the post-bellum period was a "catching up" process and would not have existed in the absence of the war. We feel this is a reasonable assumption because 1879 is the date for which observed income would equal hypothetical income, had the warless economy experienced per capita income growth at the realized 1839 to 1859 rate, 1.56 percent per year. We are implicitly assuming that once income caught up, the war exerted no influence on savings rates.18 Therefore, per capita consumption as well as per capita income are equal in both the actual and hypothetical North in 1879. This also Another possibility to consider is an outward shift in the production possibilities frontier due in some way to the outcome of the war. We depict the situation in the North if there are benefits which accrue to the Union, as implied by the Beards and Hacker. The war cost the Union CD in foregone butter, but if CE of this commodity is returned as the victor's prize, only ED remains as the net indirect cost. If the production possibilities frontier shifts out sufficiently, CE can be greater than CD, implying that net benefits could have accrued to the citizens of the triumphant North. implies that in terms of foregone consumption the North experienced no further war costs after 1879. We have incorporated business fluctuations by assuming that deviations from the trend rate of growth in per capita consumption experienced after the war would also have occurred in the hypothetical economy. Alternative assumptions for the hypothetical consumption streams are considered below, but we feel that those outlined above are the most plausible. The indirect war cost is computed separately for two groups, "natives," and all U.S. residents. The cost to natives is the foregone consumption experienced by those alive in 1861 and their descendants. Assuming that persons alive in 1861 discounted their children's consumption at the same rate at which they discounted their own, this estimate can be compared to the cost of any proposals which were alternatives to war.
The second method, the cost to all U.S. residents, adds to the above estimate the foregone consumption of all immigrants who entered after the conflict began. This estimate will be compared to the direct cost results to shed light on many of the historical questions raised in the above introduction. Table 4 Table 12 , "Actual Per Capita Consumption," and Table 13 , "Hypothetical Per Capita Consumption," all in the Appendix, for derivation of these figures. It should be noted that our 'actual' figures for 1861 to 1865 are based on a particular set of assumptions. We have therefore computed alternative measures of both actual and hypothetical consumption. These are presented in Table 8 . b A 6 percent interest rate has been used to discount to 1861 the differences between (1) and (2), and (3) and (4) Therefore per capita consumption in the hypothetical, warless South is assumed to grow at the realized 1839 to 1859 rate until 1909.
The indirect cost for the South is also computed for the two groups defined in the northern case, and consumption for the hypothetical and actual South is given in Table 5 with supporting data in the Appendix. The indirect cost in 1860 dollars in 1861 is 9.335 billion for natives and 8.970 billion for the total population.
In interpreting the indirect cost estimate for the South it should be noted that it encompasses not merely the actual war costs but also the effects of emancipation and reconstruction. Therefore it Table 4 . c The native population estimates for the South exceed the total population figures after 1869 because of outmigration (see Table 11 ). Since average per capita costs in the South are applied to natives whether or not they migrated, the indirect cost estimate for natives exceeds that for the total southern population. This also explains why Table 7 shows a slightly higher cost to natives than to all residents. Sources: See above. includes any change in consumption due to a lowering in work effort by freed slaves. To the extent that freedmen withdrew a portion of their labor after emancipation in favor of increased leisure our estimate will be increased. In addition, any scale economies which could be reaped only from a slave plantation economy will also be included. world economy" (p. 635) . If the demand for cotton rose at a slower rate after than before the war, some of our indirect measure would be capturing this change, which is probably not due to the war. Table 6 . Table 7 
Alternative Indirect Estimates
Our estimate of the indirect cost of the Civil War to the North and the South depends crucially on assumptions concerning the rate at which the economy would have grown in the absence of conflict and the rate at which actual consumption changed during the war. In order to ascertain the sensitivity of our results to the particular 22 We have separated costs due to war deaths from other components because this is an item which can be computed in several ways depending on one's point of view. In addition, there are many uses of these statistics for which an estimate including war deaths would be inappropriate. 23 Note that we have excluded children who would have been born to men whose deaths were due to the war. assumptions chosen we have reestimated them on the basis of alternative hypotheses.
Actual per capita consumption under the alternative assumption is constructed to decline at a constant rate throughout the period 1861 to 1869, rather than to decline from 1861 to 1865 and then rise from 1865 to 1869 at the realized 1869 to 1879 rate. The alternative assumption for the hypothetical economy, which finds its roots in the works of Hacker and the Beards, is that in the absence of war the northern economy would have grown at a rate slower than that achieved during the pre-war period. This is also applied to the South in light of the presumption of many that southern growth would have declined even without the war.24 We have chosen the rather low rate of one percent as our alternative rate of change in hypothetical per capita consumption from 1861 to 1879 and apply the hypothetical rate used above for the period after 1879.
We present three cases using these alternative assumptions. The first uses the original actual stream and the alternative hypothetical stream. The second applies the alternative actual stream and the original hypothetical stream and the third uses both alternative streams.
The indirect cost estimates given in Table 8 for the South are fairly insensitive to changes in our assumptions about the hypothetical and actual growth rates, and for the set of assumptions (Case 3) which minimizes the cost of the war, the indirect measure declines by only fourteen percent. That for the North is somewhat more sensitive to changes in our assumptions, and the set (Case 3) most unfavorable to our conclusions results in only half the previ- ously measured indirect cost. Although this may appear to be a large change, it does not drastically affect our qualitative results.
We have also constructed additional estimates using alternative rates of return. Although we have based our six percent discount rate on an average of rates of return earned during the period 1861 to 1909,25 we realize that a consideration of other discount rates is useful. The estimates in Table 9 show the sensitivity of our results to discount rates close to six (viz. five and seven) and also to a zero discount rate. Our quantitative results are not much affected by the first two, while the latter yields very high indirect costs for the South. North "caught up" by 1879, no costs are experienced by Union citizens after that date. The South, however, did not experience this rapid catching up process, and foregone consumption losses continue into the twentieth century.
Those who remained in the South experienced the greatest losses. In fact as late as 1909 southerners on average consumed roughly thirty percent less than had per capita consumption continued to grow after 1860 at the antebellum rate. These persistent losses in the South are due to a variety of causes among which we cannot distinguish at the present time. There were capital losses, general instability and commercial stoppage. The slow recovery in the South One interpretation of the Beard-Hacker thesis is that the Civil War enabled greater growth rates than would have been achieved in the U.S. without the war. This implies that some of the costs of the war were offset by benefits from industrialization. Even though wartime destruction reduced our capacity to produce consumption goods, the war's political consequences may have produced a higher rate of growth of per capita consumption. Therefore it is possible that the war conferred net benefits on either the whole U.S. or at least on the northern sector.
Many economists and historians have challenged these views, using data on industrialization gathered since the Beard and Hacker volumes were written. They have, in general, found that the era following the Civil War was not a break with the past in terms of economic activity. For example, Cochran reports that changes in value added for the period 1839 to 1859 are similar to those for 1869 to 1889, and that the war had little lasting impact on the production of pig iron, bituminous coal, and railroad track. Engerman reiterates the Cochran position with further data and shows that total commodity output grew at 4.6 percent from 1840 to 1860 and at 4.4 percent from 1870 to 1900. In addition, the shift toward manufacturing after the war was merely a continuation of changes already begun before the conflict.27 The Civil War for these scholars has not stood up to the test of being a watershed era.
Although it now seems clear that the Civil War did not radically alter the path of American industrialization, the debate on the impact of the war still has not answered the question of whether the war conferred net gains on the North or on the U.S. as a whole. We interpret the Beards and Hacker to imply that many groups in the U.S. benefited on net from the Civil War, and we can partially test this proposition with our direct and indirect cost estimates.28
The direct cost statistic measures all war costs except those due to political instability, possible postwar gains stemming directly from the war, and so on. The indirect estimate captures all costs and benefits, for it measures total consumption foregone due to the war. Therefore the difference between the two can be identified as any cost or benefit which was not included in the direct estimate. In particular, the gains from industrialization, a la Hacker and the Beards, would be contained in this difference.
The North experienced $3.37 billion in direct costs and $5.23 billion using the indirect method. Therefore, $1.86 billion was not captured in the direct cost estimate. If the North experienced an increase in consumption due to the war, it had to have been either very minor or much overweighed by unrecorded war destruction and costs.29 27 See Cochran, "Did the Civil War Retard Industrialization?" and Engerman, "The Economic Impact of the Civil War," in Andreano, The Economic Impact of the American Civil War. 28 Our reading of the Beards and Hacker is only one of several possible interpretations. For example, they could be implying that the distribution of income, not actual consumption, was changed. But even if this is the correct interpretation, we can test the proposition that the North alone gained at the expense of the South. In addition, although the Beards and Hacker allow for "spillover" effects to other sectors, they may be saying that only northern capitalists gained at the expense of labor. We have not attempted to test this proposition. See Engerman, "The Impact of the American Civil War," on this point. 29 As noted above, this conclusion holds only if we assume that per capita consumption in the North would have continued to grow at close to, or above, the prewar rate in the absence of a war. Using both alternative hypotheses (Case 3, Table  8 ) changes our results, and we get a $1.09 billion ($3.366-$2.271) gross gain to the The difference in the southern direct and indirect measures is even greater and amounts to a staggering $4.23 billion. Included in this figure are costs due to the loss of scale economies from the use of slaves in agriculture, capital destruction which was not included in our estimate, and political instabilities during the war and reconstruction periods.30
In conclusion, we find no evidence that the Civil War benefited either the North or the whole U.S. even in a gross way. On the contrary, the costs of the war were so wide-ranging and persistent that in spite of thorough investigation the direct measure captures only forty-two percent of these costs for the entire United States.3' CLAUDIA D. GOLDIN, Princeton University FRANK D. LEWIS, Queen's University, Ontario
North from the war. But since the indirect cost is still positive this possible redistribution was outweighed by other costs resulting from the conflict. 30 We have netted out losses due to a decline in freedman's work effort by subtracting our upper bound figure of $1.96 billion. 31 $6.66 billion has been accounted for in our direct cost estimate although the indirect estimate yields ($14.70 -$1.96 = $12.74). We subtract from the indirect measure our estimate for the cost of greater leisure time in the post-bellum South.
